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Abstract We develop a multi-agent deontic action logic to study the logical
behaviour of two types of deontic conditionals: (1) conditional obligations, having
the form ‘‘If group H were to perform action aH, then, in group F ’s interest, group
G ought to perform action aG’’ and (2) conditional permissions, having the form ‘‘If
group H were to perform action aH, then, in group F ’s interest, group G may
perform action aG’’. First, we define a formal language for multi-agent deontic
action logic and a class of consequentialist models to interpret the formulas of the
language. Second, we define a transformation that converts any strategic game into a
consequentialist model. Third, we show that an outcome a is a Nash equilibrium of
a strategic game if and only if a conjunction of certain conditional permissions is
true in the consequentialist model that results from the transformation of that
strategic game.
1 Introduction
Deontic logic concerns the formal study of obligations, permissions, and prohibi-
tions. Since its inception in 1951 by G.H. von Wright, it has been a lively and
fruitful branch of philosophical logic that has led to a wealth of technical results on
formal aspects of normativity. It has long been largely confined, however, to the
formal study of norms within single-agent or even agentless contexts, because
deontic logicians primarily focussed on how things ought to be rather than on what
agents ought to do. The development of a multi-agent logic of agency in the late
1990s has finally made it possible to transpose deontic logic from single-agent to
multi-agent settings, and to use it to investigate normative aspects of strategic
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interaction.1 As a result, multi-agent deontic logic studies obligations, permissions,
and prohibitions within the context of formal models of strategic interaction
between (groups of) agents with different preferences.
Strategic interaction between (coalitions of) players with different preferences is,
of course, also studied mathematically in game theory. Hence, multi-agent deontic
logic and game theory both study multi-agent phenomena that are largely
comparable, albeit that these phenomena are approached from widely diverging
perspectives: whereas deontic logicians concentrate on the formal structure of moral
obligations, game theorists focus on interactive decision making. Several authors
have called for an integration of deontic logic and game theory (Apostel 1960;
Åqvist 1974; van Hees 1995, 1996). They did so not only to pinpoint these
differences in perspective, but also to give more structure to the obligations,
permissions, and prohibitions they studied. Their formalisms, however, were not so
fine-grained as is the multi-agent deontic logic that was set forth only recently by
Horty (2001) and Kooi and Tamminga (2008b). Built upon on the stit logics of
agency that were developed in Kanger (1957, 1972), Pörn (1970), von Kutschera
(1986) and Horty and Belnap (1995),2 their multi-agent deontic logic provides a
unified framework for the formal interpretation of group actions, group abilities, and
group obligations. The question of how to establish connections between this new
multi-agent deontic logic and game theory is therefore both natural and pressing.
The aim of the present paper is to give a partial answer to this question: we translate
strategic games into the models that we use to interpret multi-agent deontic action
logic3 and then characterize Nash equilibria of strategic games in terms of
conditional permissions from this logic.4
Game theorists may have reservations against any interpretation of game theory
in terms of concepts from moral theory. We therefore briefly discuss the conditions
under which a rapprochement between game theory and moral theory is
conceptually defensible. We submit that under the double assumption that the
preferences that figure in our deontic logic are extrinsic preferences and that
1 See Belnap et al. (2001) for a textbook presentation of multi-agent logics of agency.
2 For more on the early history of stit logics of agency, see Hansson (1986).
3 Pauly (2001) also establishes formal relations between strategic games and models. He uses his
coalition models, which are possible worlds-based neighbourhood models, to interpret Coalition Logic, a
modal logic to reason about group abilities.
4 Other logical characterizations of Nash equilibria have been provided by Harrenstein et al. (2003), van
der Hoek et al. (2005), van Benthem et al. (2005), Bonzon et al. (2006), van Benthem (2007), Roy (2008)
and Lorini (2010). Their approaches differ from ours in various respects: Bonzon et al. (2006)
characterize Nash equilibria of n-player Boolean games, whereas Harrenstein et al. (2003), van Benthem
et al. (2005), van Benthem (2007) and Roy (2008) all focus on Nash equilibria of extensive games. Only
van der Hoek et al. (2005) and Lorini (2010) characterize, just as we do here, Nash equilibria of strategic
games. The former expresses Nash equilibria in terms of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL)
extended with counterfactual commitment operators and atomic propositions that capture the agents’
utilities, whereas the latter uses a combination of a variant of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) and
preference logic to formulate Nash equilibria. We shall characterize them in terms of conditional
permissions, without making the agents’ utilities or preferences explicit in the language. Moreover, unlike
the models proposed by van der Hoek et al. (2005) and Lorini (2010) that can be used to represent
sequences of group actions, our models represent group abilities, actions, obligations, and permissions at
a single moment in time.
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evaluative act consequentialism is our moral theory, the conceptual gap between
game theory and moral theory is minimized. (Those who are primarily interested in
our formal results may skip the rest of this introduction, except for the last
paragraph.)
To minimize this conceptual gap, we have to be specific on (1) the type of moral
theory that gives rise to the obligations and permissions we set out to formalize, and
(2) the type of preferences that figure in our deontic logic as the evaluative basis for
the moral rightness of actions. Let us address the latter point first. At first sight,
obligatory actions and preferred actions are worlds apart: it is perfectly possible that
I have the obligation to do X, but at the same time prefer not-X to X. Things begin to
look different, however, as soon as we make a distinction between extrinsic
preferences (which are the result of a previous judgment of betterness on the basis of
reasons) and intrinsic preferences (which reflect the unreasoned subjective likings
of the agents concerned)—see von Wright (1963, p. 14). Preferences in game theory
typically are all-things-considered, extrinsic preferences. Now, given the distinction
between extrinsic and intrinsic preferences, it still makes perfect sense that I have
the obligation to do X and at the same time intrinsically prefer not-X to X (‘‘I have
the obligation to pay my debts, but I prefer not to do so: I just don’t feel like it’’).
Some intellectual effort is needed, however, to imagine a situation where I have the
obligation to do X and at the same time extrinsically prefer not-X to X. Hence, a first
step in bringing deontic logic and game theory together, is to assume that the
preferences that figure in our deontic logic, guiding agents in evaluating the moral
rightness of their actions, are extrinsic.
To make the conceptual match between deontic logic and game theory even
closer, we also have to be specific on the type of moral theory that gives rise to the
obligations and permissions we aim to formalize. From a deontological perspective,
it still might be that I have the obligation to do X and at the same time extrinsically
prefer not-X to X (‘‘I have the obligation to return the gun to you, because I
promised that, but all-things-considered I prefer not to do so’’). This possibility is
minimized once we adopt an evaluative version of act consequentialism as the
moral theory that tells us where obligations and permissions come from.5 For the
sake of the argument, this is what we shall do here. In evaluative act
consequentialism, the moral rightness of an action only depends on the value of
its consequences: the value of the consequences of returning the gun to you is
weighed against the value of the consequences of not returning the gun to you. The
action with the highest-valued consequences is the morally right one. (Unlike
classical act utilitarianism, where the moral rightness of an action depends on the
consequences it has for all agents, our brand of act consequentialism acknowledges
different sorts of moral rightness of an action depending on the value of its
consequences for specific interest groups. To formalize these different sorts of moral
rightness, we assume that each group F of agents has its own extrinsic preference
relation over the full set of possible consequences.) It will be seen below that the
modelling of obligations by way of a formal framework inspired by evaluative act
consequentialism using extrinsic preferences as the basis for the evaluation of the
5 See Darwall (2003) for an overview of the main positions within consequentialism.
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moral rightness of actions makes it plausible that in the interest of a group F of
agents an action is obligatory if and only if that action has according to F the
highest-valued consequences, and that an action has according to F the highest-
valued consequences if and only if that action is best in the ordering induced by F ’s
extrinsic preference relation, and that an action is best in the ordering induced by
F ’s extrinsic preference relation if and only if the group F of agents extrinsically
prefers that action to all the other actions. The consequentialist models we shall use
to interpret the formulas of multi-agent deontic action logic thus establish a strong
conceptual bond between (our particular version of) deontic logic and game theory.
The main purpose of this paper, however, is to establish formal connections between
multi-agent deontic action logic and game theory.
The set-up of the paper is as follows. First, we define a formal language for multi-
agent deontic action logic and a class of consequentialist models to formally
interpret the formulas of that language. Second, we give standard definitions of
strategic games and Nash equilibria. Third, we define a transformation T and a
valuation function v that convert any strategic game G into a consequentialist model
hTðGÞ; vi. Fourth, we show, as a benchmark case for establishing formal
connections between deontic logic and game theory, that an outcome a is a Nash
equilibrium of strategic game G if and only if a finite conjunction of certain
conditional permissions is true in the consequentialist model hTðGÞ; vi.
2 Multi-Agent Deontic Action Logic
The multi-agent deontic action logic to be presented in this paper studies the logical
behavior of four types of deontic statements: (1) absolute obligations of the form
‘‘In group F ’s interest, group G ought to perform action aG’’ (abbreviated as OFG aG),
(2) conditional obligations of the form ‘‘If groupH were to perform action aH, then,
in group F ’s interest, group G ought to perform action aG’’ (abbreviated as
OFG ðaG=aHÞ), (3) absolute permissions of the form ‘‘In group F ’s interest, group G
may perform action aG’’ (abbreviated as P
F
G aG), and (4) conditional permissions of
the form ‘‘If group H were to perform action aH, then, in group F ’s interest, group
G may perform action aG’’ (abbreviated as PFG ðaG=aHÞ).
6 (Conditions under which
conditional obligations reduce to absolute obligations, and under which conditional
permissions reduce to absolute permissions are given in Lemmas 1 and 3.)
Obligations and permissions are closely related. Starting from the fairly common
assumption that obligations with respect to a certain moral code do not recommend
incompatible actions, in the current framework an obligation singles out the unique
course of action that best serves the interest of a particular group. Whereas an
obligation is uniquely action-guiding, a permission might leave open several options
for acting. As a consequence, obligations and permissions have different logical
properties (see Lemma 3).
6 Conditional obligations and conditional permissions were first introduced in deontic logic by von
Wright (1956, p. 509).
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We interpret obligations and permissions on consequentialist models. These
models are identical to the ones that were first set forth by Kooi and Tamminga
(2008b), except for some minor details: Kooi and Tamminga (1) use utility
functions rather than preference relations, (2) conceive of group utility as the
arithmetical mean of individual utilities, and (3) think of utility functions as part of
the interpretation of consequentialist frames rather than as an integral part of the
consequentialist frames themselves.7 Kooi and Tamminga (2008b) use their
consequentialist models to interpret absolute obligations indexed by an acting
group G and an interest group F . Their approach differs from ours in that we here
study the actions a group ought to perform, rather than the states of affairs a group
ought to ensure. Moreover, Kooi and Tamminga do not discuss deontic conditionals,
which are central to the present paper.
Our deontic conditionals can be used to study properties of strategic games. For
example, Lemma 2 tells us that the formula ðOFHaH ^O
F
G ðaG=aHÞÞ ! O
F
G aG
(‘deontic detachment’) is not true in all consequentialist models. Given our
transformation that converts any strategic game into a consequentialist model, we
can ask for the class of strategic games that is characterized by the property of
deontic detachment.8 In this way, our multi-agent deontic action logic enables us to
pose new questions about strategic games. The answers, however, must be
postponed to another paper. Let us address the basic formalities first.
2.1 Language
Throughout the paper, we use a propositional modal language L built from (1) a
countable set P ¼ fp1; p2; . . .g of atomic propositions and (2) a countable set A ¼
fanG : G  N and n 2 Ng of atomic action propositions, where N is an arbitrary but
fixed finite set of agents and N is the set of natural numbers. Thus, for each group G
of agents there is a countable set AG ¼ fa1G; a2G; . . .g of atomic action propositions.
We use p and q as variables for atomic propositions in P, and aG and aH as variables
for atomic action propositions in A. The formal language L is the smallest set (in
terms of set-theoretical inclusion) satisfying the conditions (i) through (ix):
(i) P [A  L
(ii) If u 2 L, then :u 2 L
(iii) If u;w 2 L, then u ^ w 2 L
(iv) If u 2 L, then }u 2 L
(v) If aG 2 A and u 2 L, then ½aGu 2 L
(vi) If aG 2 A and F  N , then OFG aG 2 L
(vii) If aG 2 A and F  N , then PFG aG 2 L
7 Kooi and Tamminga’s consequentialist models are a generalization of the utilitarian models Jeff Horty
constructed to formally interpret statements of the form ‘‘Agent i ought to see to it that u’’ and ‘‘Agent
i has the ability to see to it that u’’ (Horty 1996, 2001). Horty’s utilitarian models, in turn, are grafted on
the branching-time models for stit logics of agency that were developed by Nuel Belnap and others.
8 A class C of consequentialist models characterizes a formula u, if for all consequentialist models M it
holds that M 2 C if and only if M  u.
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(viii) If aG; aH 2 A and F  N and H  N  G, then OFG ðaG=aHÞ 2 L
(ix) If aG; aH 2 A and F  N and H  N  G, then PFG ðaG=aHÞ 2 L.
We leave out brackets and braces if the omission does not give rise to ambiguities.
L is rich enough to express (1) action statements like ‘‘Group G performs action
aG’’ (formalized as aG), ‘‘Group G has the ability to perform action aG’’ (formalized
as }aG), and ‘‘Group G sees to it that u by performing action aG’’ (formalized as
½aGu) and (2) deontic statements like ‘‘In his own interest, agent i may perform
action ai’’ (formalized as P
i
iai) and ‘‘If agent i were to perform action ai, then, in the
grand coalition’s interest, group G ought to perform action aG’’ (formalized as
ONG ðaG=aiÞ). How diverse these statements may be, they can all be formally
interpreted in terms of consequentialist models.
2.2 Consequentialist Models
Consequentialist models are Kripke-style possible worlds models. They are built
from a non-empty set of possible worlds and a finite set of agents. The models are
used to interpret group abilities, actions, obligations, and permissions at a single
moment in time. Each group of agents is assigned its own choice set that consists of
the group’s options for acting. A group of agents performs an action by choosing an
option from its choice set. Each choice set is modelled as a partition of the full set of
possible worlds, and hence the performance of an action by a group is modelled as a
restriction of the full set of possible worlds to those worlds that are elements of the
option that corresponds to the action being performed. Each group of agents has its
own preference relation over the full set of possible worlds.9
We make these ideas precise by first defining the consequentialist frames that
model group actions and group preferences. On the basis of these frames, we then
define the consequentialist models that interpret the atomic (action) propositions.
Definition 1 A consequentialist frame F is a quadruple hW;N ;Choice; ðFÞi,
whereW is a non-empty set of possible worlds, N is a finite set of agents, Choice is
a partition function, and F is a reflexive, transitive, and complete relation on W
for each F  N .
Choice sets of individual agents are given by a partition function Choice : N !
}ð}ðWÞÞ that meets two conditions: (1) for each agent i 2 N it holds that ChoiceðiÞ
is a partition of W, and (2) for each selection function s assigning to each agent




9 Although it seems natural to think of a group’s preference relation as being somehow reducible to the
preference relations of the group’s constituent members (but see List and Pettit 2011), we have chosen to
keep matters general by not choosing for a particular aggregation function from a wide variety of options.
This policy prevents such an aggregation function from interfering with the logic. A group’s preference
relation represents that group’s ‘interests’, broadly conceived. It not only covers the group’s own welfare,
but may well include the welfare of others who are not in that group.
10 The second condition is the requirement of agent independence. It guarantees that there is a possible
world in which each individual agent performs the action of his choice, irrespective of the actions all
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For example, let W ¼ fw1;w2;w3;w4g and N ¼ fi; jg. Let ChoiceðiÞ ¼
ffw1;w2g; fw3;w4gg and ChoiceðjÞ ¼ ffw1;w3g; fw2;w4gg. Then Choice is a
partition function, since it meets the two conditions. As for condition (1), note that
both ChoiceðiÞ and ChoiceðjÞ are partitions of W. As for condition (2), note that
there are in our example four possible selection functions:
s1ðiÞ ¼ fw1;w2g s1ðjÞ ¼ fw1;w3g
s2ðiÞ ¼ fw1;w2g s2ðjÞ ¼ fw2;w4g
s3ðiÞ ¼ fw3;w4g s3ðjÞ ¼ fw1;w3g
s4ðiÞ ¼ fw3;w4g s4ðjÞ ¼ fw2;w4g:
Hence, for every selection function s that assigns to agent i an option s(i) in
ChoiceðiÞ and to agent j an option s(j) in ChoiceðjÞ it holds that s(i) \ s(j) = ;.
Next, we generalize the partition function for individual agents to a partition
function Choice : }ðN Þ ! }ð}ðWÞÞ for groups of agents. Let Select be the set of
all selection functions s assigning to each individual agent i 2 N an option




sðiÞ : s 2 Select
( )
;
if G is non-empty. Otherwise, ChoiceðGÞ ¼ fWg.
In our example, the set Choiceði; jÞ of actions available to the group {i, j} is
given by {{w1}, {w2}, {w3}, {w4}}, since Select = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and hence
Choiceði; jÞ ¼ fs1ðiÞ \ s1ðjÞ; s2ðiÞ \ s2ðjÞ; s3ðiÞ \ s3ðjÞ; s4ðiÞ \ s4ðjÞg.
Definition 2 A consequentialist model M is an ordered pair hF; vi, where F is a
consequentialist frame and v a valuation function that assigns to each atomic
proposition p 2 P a set of worlds vðpÞ 2 }ðWÞ and to each atomic action
proposition aG 2 A a set of worlds vðaGÞ 2 ChoiceðGÞ.
In a consequentialist model, each possible action of each group of agents is
assumed to have a name, that is, for each G  N and each K 2 ChoiceðGÞ there is
an atomic action proposition aG 2 A such that vðaGÞ ¼ K.
2.3 Absolute and Conditional F -Dominance
As we are currently interested in building bridges between deontic logic and game
theory, we follow the conceptual guidelines of the introduction and interpret
obligations and permissions in consequentialist models that make use of extrinsic
preferences as the basis for the evaluation of the moral rightness of actions. In
search of such a formal interpretation of conditional obligations and permissions, we
adopt the distinction made above that obligations are uniquely action-guiding,
Footnote 10 continued
other individual agents perform. Hence, the definition of Choice ensures that at a single moment in time
no individual agent can prevent any other individual agent from performing an action. See for defenses of
this requirement Belnap et al. (2001, pp. 217–218 and p. 283) and Horty (2001, pp. 30–31).
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whereas permissions are not. Hence, we stipulate that an action is obligatory for a
group of agents if it is the single best thing the group can do. Likewise, an action is
permitted for a group of agents if it is among the best things the group can do.11 To
implement these stipulations within the context of a consequentialist frame F, this
means that for each group G of agents we need to order its available actions in terms
of the preference relations F . Hence, we have to transform each preference
relation F into an F -ordering of the set ChoiceðGÞ. Obviously, there are several
ways to do this. Here we adopt the notion of dominance and adapt it to the present
situation.12
Definition 3 Let F be a consequentialist frame. Let F ;G  N and H  N  G.
Let K;K 0 2 ChoiceðGÞ and L 2 ChoiceðHÞ. Then
KFG K 0 iff for all S 2 ChoiceðN  GÞ and for all w;w
0 2 W it holds that
if w 2 K \ S and w0 2 K 0 \ S, then w F w0.
KFðG=H;LÞ K 0 iff for all S 2 ChoiceððN  GÞ HÞ and for all w;w
0 2 W it holds that
if w 2 K \ L \ S and w0 2 K 0 \ L \ S, then w F w0.
As usual, K [FG K
0 if and only if K FG K 0 and K 0lFG K. In the same fashion,
K [FðG=H;LÞ K
0 if and only if KFðG=H;LÞ K 0 and K 0lFðG=H;LÞ K.
Intuitively, it holds that K FG K 0 if and only if group G’s action K furthers the
interests of group F at least as well as group G’s action K0, regardless of the
collective action that is performed by the group N  G of remaining agents.
Likewise, it holds that K FðG=H;LÞ K 0 if and only if given that group H performs
action L, group G’s action K furthers the interests of group F at least as well as
group G’s action K0, regardless of the collective action that is performed by the
group ðN  GÞ H of remaining agents.
To illustrate the notions of absolute and conditional F -dominance, consider the
following (partial) description of a consequentialist frame built from three agents
and eight possible worlds, where ChoiceðiÞ ¼ fK1;K2g and ChoiceðjÞ ¼ fL1; L2g
and ChoiceðkÞ ¼ fM1;M2g. The preference relations j and i;j;k are given in
Fig. 1 by the left- and right-hand side utilities, respectively (the other six preference
relations are left unspecified).
11 Leo Apostel writes: ‘‘an act is obligatory, if it is the only act such that there is no other act equally
good or better’’ and ‘‘an act is permissible if it can be considered as the application of a strategy such that
there is no better one (there may be many equally good)’’ (Apostel 1960, p. 75). Similarly, in an interview
with Alex Voorhoeve, Ken Binmore states: ‘‘[morality] includes the rules for sustaining an equilibrium in
a game, which specify those actions that are permitted and those actions that will be punished’’
(Voorhoeve 2009, p. 140).
12 Absolute F -dominance was first defined in Kooi and Tamminga (2008b, p. 9). We insert an interest
group F , an acting group H, and an option L 2 ChoiceðHÞ in Horty’s Definition 5.2 (Horty 2001, p. 97)
to define conditional F -dominance.
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As for absolute F -dominance, note that agent i’s action K1 furthers the interests
of agent j at least as well as agent i’s action K2, regardless of the four possible
collective actions of the group {j, k}. Hence, it holds that K1 C i




As for conditional F -dominance, note that given that agent k performs action M1,
agent i’s action K1 furthers the interests of the group {i, j, k} at least as well as agent
i’s action K2, regardless of the two possible actions of agent j. Hence, it holds that
K1 i;j;kði=k;M1Þ K2. Note, however, that K1l
i;j;k
ði=k;M2Þ K2.
In fact, absolute F -dominance is a special case of conditional F -dominance.
Since Choiceð;Þ ¼ fWg, it holds that KFG K 0 iff KFðG=;;WÞ K 0.
2.4 Semantics
Now that we have defined the notions of a consequentialist model, of absolute and
conditional F -dominance, we are in a position to give the semantical rules that state
the conditions under which a formula u from the language L is true at a world w in a
consequentialist model M. We write M;w  u if this is the case.
Definition 4 (Semantical Rules) Let M ¼ hF; vi be a consequentialist model. Let
F ;G  N and let H  N  G. Let w 2 W and let p 2 P and aG; aH 2 A and
u;w 2 L. Then
M;w  p iff w 2 vðpÞ
M;w  aG iff w 2 vðaGÞ
M;w  :u iff M;w 6 u
M;w  u ^ w iff M;w  u and M;w  w
M;w  }u iff there is a w0 such that M;w0  u
M;w  ½aGu iff w 2 vðaGÞ and for all w0 2 vðaGÞ it holds that M;w0  u
M;w  OFG aG iff for all K in ChoiceðGÞ with K 6¼ vðaGÞ it holds that vðaGÞ[
F
G K
M;w  PFG aG iff for all K in ChoiceðGÞ with K 6¼ vðaGÞ it holds that vðaGÞ
F
G K
M;w  OFG ðaG=aHÞ iff for all K in ChoiceðGÞ with K 6¼ vðaGÞ it holds that vðaGÞ[
F
ðG=H;vðaHÞÞ K
M;w  PFG ðaG=aHÞ iff for all K in ChoiceðGÞ with K 6¼ vðaGÞ it holds that vðaGÞ
F
ðG=H;vðaHÞÞ K.
We adopt a standard notational convention: given a model M, we write M  u, if
for all worlds w inW it holds that M;w  u. We write  u, if for all models M it
holds that M  u.
The following formulas are true in all models:
Fig. 1 A consequentialist frame
with preference relations j and
i;j;k
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Lemma 1 Let aG; aH; a; 2 A. Then
(i)  PFG ðaG=aHÞ ! }aG
(ii)  OFG ðaG=aHÞ ! P
F
G ðaG=aHÞ
(iii)  OFG ðaG=aHÞ ! ðO
F
G ða0G=aHÞ $ P
F
G ða0G=aHÞÞ
(iv)  OFG ðaG=aHÞ ! ðP
F
G ða0G=aHÞ $ hðaG $ a0GÞÞ
(v)  OFG aG $ O
F
G ðaG=a;Þ
(vi)  PFG aG $ P
F
G ðaG=a;Þ.
The first formula states that a conditional permission to perform an action implies
the ability to perform that action. The second formula states that a conditional
obligation to perform an action implies the corresponding conditional permission to
perform that action.13 The third and the fourth formulas are true because of the
uniqueness requirement in the semantical rule for conditional obligations. The last
two formulas show that an absolute obligation is a conditional obligation with a
vacuous condition, and that an absolute permission is a conditional permission with
a vacuous condition.
The following formulas are not true in all models:
Lemma 2 Let aG; aH 2 A: Then
(i) 6 ðaH ^OFG ðaG=aHÞÞ ! O
F
G aG (factual detachment)
(ii) 6 ðaH ^ PFG ðaG=aHÞÞ ! P
F
G aG
(iii) 6 ðOFHaH ^O
F
G ðaG=aHÞÞ ! O
F
G aG (deontic detachment)
(iv) 6 ðPFHaH ^ P
F
G ðaG=aHÞÞ ! P
F
G aG.
The first invalidity shows that if both an action and an obligation conditional on that
action are true, then the corresponding absolute obligation might still be false. The
third invalidity shows that if both an absolute obligation to perform an action and an
obligation conditional on that action are true, then the corresponding absolute
obligation might still be false. For absolute and conditional permissions the situation
is the same.
There is, however, a different way to characterize the relation between absolute
and conditional permissions: group G may perform action aG in the interest of group
F if and only if group G may perform action aG in the interest of group F regardless
of what action any other group of agents were to perform. (This equivalence does
not hold for absolute and conditional obligations.14)
13 In Standard Deontic Logic, Ou! Pu or, equivalently, :ðOu ^O:uÞ is known as the principle (D).
Rejecting its validity is tantamount to admitting incompatible obligations. Goble (2005) presents a fairly
standard deontic logic that does not validate (D).
14 Let M be a consequentialist model consisting of four worlds and two agents i and j, where ChoiceðiÞ ¼
fK1;K2g and ChoiceðjÞ ¼ fL1;L2g. The preference relation i is given by the utilities ui(K1 \ L1) = 1
and ui(K1 \ L2) = ui(K2 \ L1) = ui(K2 \ L2) = 0. Let v(ai) = K1 and v(aj) = L2. Then it holds that





Lemma 3 (Absolute and Conditional Permissions) Let M ¼ hF; vi be a conse-
quentialist model. Let F ;G  N and let H  N  G: Let aG 2 A: Then the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) M  PFG aG
(ii) M  PFG ðaG=aHÞ for all aH 2 A.
Proof See Appendix. h
It should be noted that our formal semantics provides truth conditions for a wide
variety of conditional obligations and permissions, not all of which have their
counterpart in game theory. Given the general form PFG ðaG=aHÞ of a conditional
permission, we can distinguish at least four different types according to the specifics
of F ;G, and H: (1) conditional permissions where G is a non-singleton group of
agents, (2) conditional permissions whereG andH do not partition the grand coalition,
that is, where G [ H 6¼ N , (3) conditional permissions where the acting group G does
not coincide with the interest group F , that is, where F 6¼ G, and (4) conditional
permissions of the form Piiðai=aNiÞ, which differs from any of the other categories.
As we have seen, these four types of conditional permissions are all evaluated by the
same semantical rule. We only need the last type of conditional permissions, however,
to show that our multi-agent deontic action logic is expressive enough to capture a
central game theoretical notion: Nash equilibria of strategic games.
3 Nash Equilibria of Strategic Games
Strategic games are built from a finite set N ¼ f1; . . .; ng of players. Each player i in
N is assigned a non-empty set Ai of actions. An outcome ða1; . . .; anÞ is reached if
each player i in N chooses an action ai from his set Ai of actions. The full set A of
possible outcomes is given by the Cartesian product of all the players’ sets of
actions. Each player i has its own preference relation % i over the full set of possible
outcomes. The following definition, provided by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994,
p. 14), makes these ideas precise. We also adopt their notational conventions.15
Definition 5 A strategic game G is a triple hN; ðAiÞ; ð% iÞi, where N is a finite set
of players, for each player i 2 N it holds that Ai is a non-empty set of actions
available to player i, and for each player i 2 N it holds that % i is a preference
relation on the set of outcomes A ¼ 	i2NAi.
Unlike Osborne and Rubinstein, we assume each Ai to be finite or countably
infinite, because if we want to use our multi-agent deontic action logic to study
strategic games, we have to make sure that there is a name for each action. Just like
in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 7), preference relations % i are assumed to be
reflexive, transitive, and complete. We use ai and a

i as variables for actions in Ai.
Likewise, a and a are variables for outcomes in A. Given an outcome
15 See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Section 1.7).
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a ¼ ða1; . . .; anÞ, we use a-i to refer to the combination ða1; . . .; ai1; aiþ1; . . .; anÞ of
all the actions in a except for player i’s action ai. Given such a combination a-i of
actions and an action ai, we use (a-i, ai) to refer to ða1; . . .; anÞ.
Given a strategic game hN; ðAiÞ; ð% iÞi, for each non-empty coalition G  N we
define the set AG of actions available to coalition G as AG ¼ 	i2GAi. We use aG and
aG as variables for actions in AG. Obviously, AG is non-empty for each non-empty
coalition G. There are two borderline cases: (1) the set of actions A{i} available to
the singleton coalition {i} equals the set of actions Ai available to player i, and (2)
the set of actions AN available to the grand coalition N equals the set of outcomes A.
An outcome a ¼ ða1; . . .; anÞ is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game G if no
player can unilaterally enforce an outcome that he strictly prefers to a by choosing
a different course of action. We use the following definition (Osborne and
Rubinstein 1994, p. 14):
Definition 6 An outcome a 2 A is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game G ¼
hN; ðAiÞ; ð% iÞi if and only if for each player i 2 N it holds that
ðai; ai Þ% iðai; aiÞ for all ai 2 Ai:
3.1 From Strategic Games to Consequentialist Models
Our multi-agent deontic action logic can be used to study properties of strategic
games. To do so, we first have to transform strategic games into consequentialist
models. The models that result from this transformation make certain formulas from
the language L true and others false. Some properties of strategic games can hence
be expressed in terms of the formulas that are true in the consequentialist models
that result from the transformation of those games. As an illustration of this claim,
we show that an outcome a is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game if and only if
a conjunction of certain conditional permissions is true in the consequentialist
model that results from the transformation of that strategic game. To make things
precise, we first define a transformation T that converts any strategic game G into a
consequentialist frame TðGÞ. To obtain an appropriate consequentialist model
hTðGÞ; vi from this frame, we then define a suitable valuation function v.
The transformation T of a strategic game G into a consequentialist frame TðGÞ
takes four steps. First, we define the set of possible worlds in the consequentialist
frame as the set of outcomes in the strategic game. Second, we define the set of
agents in the consequentialist frame as the set of players in the strategic game.
Third, for each non-empty group of agents we define its choice set in the
consequentialist frame as the set of smallest sets of outcomes in the strategic game
for which that group is a-effective (the choice set of the empty group of agents is
simply defined as the set of all possible worlds).16 Fourth, each singleton group’s
16 A coalition G of players is a-effective for a set B of outcomes in a strategic game G if and only if there
is an action aG in AG such that fðaG; aGÞ 2 A : aG 2 AGg  B. Informally: regardless of the actions
performed by the other players, the coalition G can ensure that the outcome is in the set B. The notion of
a-effectivity was first defined in Moulin and Peleg (1982, p. 118). The notion is also central to Pauly’s
(2001) characterization of strategic games in terms of playable effectivity functions.
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preference relation in the consequentialist frame is defined as its preference relation
in the strategic game (preference relations for non-singleton groups of agents are
simply defined as the universal relation).
Let us make these ideas clear with the following definition:
Definition 7 Let G ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; ð% iÞi be a strategic game. The quadruple
TðGÞ¼hW;N ;Choice; ðFÞi is defined as follows:
(i) W ¼ A
(ii) N ¼ N
(iii) ChoiceðGÞ ¼ ðaG; aGÞ 2 A : aG 2 AGf g : aG 2 AGf g; if G 6¼ ;fWg; otherwise

(iv) F¼
% i; if F ¼ if g
W 	W otherwise.

The operator T transforms strategic games into a consequentialist frames:
Theorem 1 Let G be a strategic game. Then TðGÞ is a consequentialist frame.
Proof See Appendix. h
Note that there is no straightforward transformation T that converts consequen-
tialist frames F into strategic games TðFÞ, since in a consequentialist frame F it
does not necessarily hold that ChoiceðN Þ ¼ ffwg : w 2 Wg, that is, it might be that
there are two different worlds, w1 and w2, such that fw1; w2g 2 ChoiceðN Þ. In
cases as these, the grand coalition does not have the ability to enforce a choice
between w1 and w2. Consequentialist models, however, can simply distinguish these
worlds by making an atomic proposition p true in w1 and false in w2. This additional
structure can, of course, be studied with action statements of the type ½aGu and
}½aGu. In this respect, consequentialist models offer a finer-grained analysis of
strategic interaction than strategic games. Furthermore, the preference relations F
in a consequentialist frame also present an obstacle for its transformation into a
strategic game. Given two options K1;K2 2 ChoiceðN Þ such that K1 = {w1, w2}
and K2 = {w3, w4} and w1 
i w3 and w4 
i w2, it is unclear how to convert the
preference relation i on W into a preference relation % i on ChoiceðN Þ:
Given a consequentialist frame TðGÞ, we now must define a valuation function
v to obtain a consequentialist model hTðGÞ; vi. Since there are no atomic
propositions p in P to take care of, we simply put vðpÞ ¼ W for all p 2 P. As for
the atomic action propositions, we have to be more subtle, since any valuation
function v that assigns to each aG in A an action K 2 ChoiceðGÞ such that each
possible action of each group of agents has a name would in principle suffice.
Nevertheless, to establish a formal connection between best responses and
conditional permissions, we need to keep track of which atomic action proposition
aG in AG is validated by the performance of which action aG in AG:
To ensure this, we use an injective map f that for each G  N assigns to each
action aG in each AG an atomic action proposition aG in AG. If there is an action aG
in AG such that f ðaGÞ ¼ aG, then we define vf ðaGÞ ¼ fðaG; aGÞ 2 A : aG 2 AGg
(note that aG is unique, since f is injective). If there is no action aG in AG such that
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f ðaGÞ ¼ aG, then we simply put vf ðaGÞ ¼ K for some unique designated
K 2 ChoiceðGÞ. Although f ðaGÞ itself is strictly speaking not an atomic action
proposition in AG, for convenience we write M;w  f ðaGÞ if and only if M;w  aG
and f ðaGÞ ¼ aG.17 Given these conventions, we ensure that for each aG in each AG it
holds that
hTðGÞ; vf i;w  f ðaGÞ iff w 2 ðaG; aGÞ 2 A : aG 2 AGf g
Any valuation function vf for TðGÞ that is based on such an injection f will
henceforth be called a suitable valuation function.
In sum, any strategic game is embeddable in a consequentialist model, provided
that all players have at most countably many actions available to them. Given these
embeddings, we can now characterize Nash equilibria of strategic games in terms of
conditional permissions from multi-agent deontic action logic.
3.2 Nash Equilibria and Conditional Permissions
Conditional permissions enable us to give a formal characterization of Nash
equilibria of strategic games. To do so, we first characterize the notion of a best
response in terms of a conditional permission, that is, we show that an action
ai 2 Ai in a strategic game G is a best response to a collective action ai 2 Ai if
and only if the conditional permission Piiðf ðai Þ=f ðaiÞÞ is true in the consequen-
tialist model hTðGÞ; vf i:
Theorem 2 Let G be a strategic game and let vf be a suitable valuation function
for TðGÞ. Then
ðai; ai Þ% i ðai; aiÞ for all ai 2 Ai iff hTðGÞ; vf i  P
i
iðf ðai Þ=f ðaiÞÞ:
Proof See Appendix. h
Since the set N of players is finite, we immediately obtain from the previous
theorem a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of conditional permissions:
Theorem 3 Let G be a strategic game and let vf be a suitable valuation function
for TðGÞ. Then




iðf ðai Þ=f ðaiÞÞ:
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have further explored the opportunities that the framework of
consequentialist models offers for the study of strategic interaction. As Kooi and
Tamminga (2008b) showed, the framework can be used to interpret stit-like
obligations of the type ‘‘In the interest of group F of agents, group G of agents
17 Likewise, we write M  PGGðf ðaGÞ=f ðaGÞÞ if and only if M  P
G
GðaG=aHÞ and f ðaGÞ ¼ aG and
f ðaGÞ ¼ aH.
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ought to see to it that u’’ and to study the exact structural conditions under which
moral conflicts between groups of agents are possible. In the present paper the
consequentialist models were used to formally interpret multi-agent deontic action
logic. We gave truth conditions for an important class of multi-agent conditional
obligations and permissions. It was showed that strategic games where all players
have at most countably many actions available to them can be systematically
transformed into consequentialist models, and that an outcome is a Nash
equilibrium of a strategic game if and only if a conjunction of certain conditional
permissions is true in the consequentialist model that is obtained from the
transformation of that strategic game. For this characterization only a special type of
conditional permissions was needed, although, as was noted in the last paragraph of
Sect. 2, our semantics gives truth conditions for more general conditional
permissions as well. The level of generality of consequentialist models might very
well be used to further investigate systematic relations between deontic logic and
game theory. We conclude with a brief illustration of this claim.
Let us first extend the relations % i in a strategic game hN; ðAiÞ; ð% iÞi to relations
% F in an extended strategic game hN; ðAiÞ; ð% F Þi such that for each group of
players F  N it holds that % F is a preference relation on the set of outcomes (we
simplify clause (iv) of Definition 7 accordingly). Then it is easy to see that the present
formalism allows for the introduction of a solution concept for cooperative games.
Definition 8 An outcome a 2 A is a cooperative Nash equilibrium of an extended
strategic game G ¼ hN; ðAiÞ; ð% F Þi for a partition fG1; . . .;Gkg of N if and only if it
holds that








where vf is a suitable valuation function for TðGÞ.
Note that this solution concept is a straightforward generalization of the notion of
a Nash equilibrium. We leave the study of its properties to a future occasion.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3 Assume (i). Suppose aH 2 A. Suppose K 0 2 ChoiceðGÞ with
K 0 6¼ vðaGÞ. Suppose S 2 ChoiceððN  GÞ  HÞ and w;w0 2 W. Suppose
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w 2 vðaGÞ \ vðaHÞ \ S and w0 2 K 0 \ vðaHÞ \ S. Note that vðaHÞ 2 ChoiceðHÞ.
Hence, vðaHÞ \ S 2 ChoiceðN  GÞ. By assumption, it holds that vðaGÞ FG K 0.
Hence w F w0. Therefore vðaGÞ FðG=H;vðaHÞÞ K
0. Therefore M  PFG ðaG=aHÞ.
Assume (ii). Suppose K 0 2 ChoiceðGÞ with K 0 6¼ vðaGÞ. Suppose S 2
ChoiceðN  GÞ and w;w0 2 W. Suppose w 2 vðaGÞ \ S and w0 2 K 0 \ S. Note that
S = L \ M for an L 2 ChoiceðHÞ and an M 2 ChoiceððN  GÞ  HÞ. Since every
possible action has a name, there is an aH 2 A such that vðaHÞ ¼ L. By assumption,
it holds that M  PFG ðaG=aHÞ. Hence vðaGÞFðG=H;vðaHÞÞ K
0. Hence w F w0.
Therefore vðaGÞFG K 0. Therefore M  P
F
G aG. h
Proof of Theorem 1 Consider TðGÞ ¼ hW;N ;Choice; ðF Þi. We have to show
that (1) W is non-empty, (2) N is finite, (3) ChoiceðiÞ is a partition of W for each
i 2 N , (4)
T
i2N sðiÞ is non-empty for each selection function s that assigns to each
i 2 N a set of possible worlds sðiÞ 2 ChoiceðiÞ, (5) ChoiceðGÞ ¼ f
T
i2G sðiÞ : s 2
Selectg for each non-empty G  N , and (6) F is a preference relation on W for
each F  N .
Ad (1). By definition, each Ai in G is non-empty. Let ai 2 Ai for each i 2 N. Then
a ¼ 	i2Nai 2 	i2NAi ¼ A. Therefore, W is non-empty.
Ad (2). By definition, N is finite. Therefore, N is finite.
Ad (3). Suppose that K 2 ChoiceðiÞ for some i 2 N . Then K ¼ fðai; aiÞ 2 A :
ai 2 Aig for some ai 2 Ai. Since each Aj in G is non-empty, it must be that A-i is
non-empty as well. Let ai 2 Ai. Then a ¼ ðai; aiÞ 2 K. Therefore, K is non-
empty for each K 2 ChoiceðiÞ for each i 2 N .
Suppose that a 2
S
ChoiceðiÞ. Then there is a K 2 ChoiceðiÞ such that a 2 K.
It holds that K ¼ fðai; aiÞ 2 A : ai 2 Aig for some ai 2 Ai. Hence, a 2 A.
Therefore, a 2 W.
Suppose that a 2 W. It holds that a 2 A. Hence, a ¼ ðai ; aiÞ with ai 2 Ai




Suppose that there are K;K 0 2 ChoiceðiÞ and a 2 W such that a 2 K \ K 0.
Then a 2 A and ai 2 Ai. Hence, K ¼ fðai ; aiÞ 2 A : ai 2 Aig ¼ K 0.
Therefore, ChoiceðiÞ is a partition of W for each i 2 N .
Ad (4). Suppose that s is a selection function that assigns to each i 2 N a set
sðiÞ 2 ChoiceðiÞ. Since all s(i)’s are non-empty, we may take a possible world
ai 2 sðiÞ for each i 2 N . Note that ai 2 A and aii 2 Ai and sðiÞ ¼ fðaii; aiÞ 2 A :
ai 2 Aig for each i 2 N . Since N ¼ fi1; . . .; ing is finite, it must be that
ða11; . . .; annÞ 2 sðiÞ for each i 2 N . Therefore,
T
i2N sðiÞ is non-empty.
Ad (5). Suppose that K 2 ChoiceðGÞ for a non-empty G  N . Then K ¼
fðaG; aGÞ 2 A : aG 2 AGg for some aG 2 AG. Let sðiÞ ¼ fðai ; aiÞ 2 A : ai 2





i2G sðiÞ : s 2 Selectg.
Suppose that K 2 f
T
i2G sðiÞ : s 2 Selectg for a non-empty G  N . Then K ¼T
i2G sðiÞ for some s 2 Select. Since sðiÞ 2 ChoiceðiÞ for each i 2 G, it must be that
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for each i 2 G there is an ai 2 Ai such that sðiÞ ¼ fðai ; aiÞ 2 A : ai 2 Aig.
Consider aG ¼ 	i2Gai . It is easy to show that K ¼ fðaG; aGÞ 2 A : aG 2 AGg.
Therefore f
T
i2G sðiÞ : s 2 Selectg  ChoiceðGÞ.
Ad (6). By definition, % i is a preference relation on A for each i 2 N. Therefore,
for each F  N it holds that either F is the preference relation % i or F is the
preference relation W 	W. h
Proof of Theorem 2 Assume that ðai; ai Þ% iðai; aiÞ for all ai 2 Ai. Consider
hTðGÞ; vf i ¼ hW;N ;Choice;F ; vf i. Let f(ai ) = ai and f(ai) = ai. Note that
vf ðai Þ 2 ChoiceðiÞ and vf ðaiÞ 2 ChoiceðN  iÞ. Suppose that K 2 ChoiceðiÞ such
that K = vf(a

i ). By the construction of TðGÞ and vf, there must be an ai 2 Ai such
that f(ai) = ai and K = vf(ai). It suffices to show that vf ðai Þ iði=Ni;vf ðaiÞÞvf ðaiÞ.
Suppose that S 2 ChoiceððN  iÞ  ðN  iÞÞ and that w 2 vf ðai Þ \ vf ðaiÞ \ S and
w0 2 vf ðaiÞ \ vf ðaiÞ \ S. Note that ChoiceððN  iÞ  ðN  iÞÞ ¼ Choiceð;Þ ¼
fWg. Note that vf(ai ) \ vf(ai) = {(ai, ai )} and vf(ai) \ vf(ai) = {(ai, ai)}.
Hence, w = (ai, a

i ) and w
0 = (ai, ai). By assumption, we have
ðai; ai Þ% iðai; aiÞ. Hence, by the construction of TðGÞ, it must be that w i w0.
Therefore, hTðGÞ; vf i  Piiðf ðai Þ=f ðaiÞÞ.
Assume that hTðGÞ; vf i  Piiðf ðai Þ=f ðaiÞÞ. Let f(ai ) = ai and f(ai) = ai.
Suppose that ai 2 Ai. Suppose that ai = ai . By reflexivity of % i, we have
ðai; ai Þ% iðai; aiÞ. Suppose that ai = ai . Let f(ai) = ai. By the construction of
TðGÞ and vf, it must be that vf ðai Þ; vf ðaiÞ 2 ChoiceðiÞ and vf ðaiÞ 2 ChoiceðN  iÞ
and vf(ai ) = vf(ai). By assumption, we have vf ðai Þ iði=Ni;vf ðaiÞÞvf ðaiÞ. Hence, it
must be that ðai; ai Þ i ðai; aiÞ. By the construction of TðGÞ, it must be that
ðai; ai Þ% i ðai; aiÞ. Therefore, ðai; ai Þ% i ðai; aiÞ for all ai 2 Ai: h
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